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Labor and Employment Law. Rhode Island American
Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8037 v. Johnston School
Committee, 212 A.3d 156 (R.I. 2019). Retired teachers are entitled
to life insurance at the rate at which the policy existed upon
retirement so long as they continue to pay premiums, and the town
cannot raise those premiums pursuant to Rhode Island law.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Under a collective bargaining agreement between the town of
Johnston, Rhode Island and its teachers, the town provided actively
employed school teachers with life insurance and paid the
insurance policy premiums. 1 Upon retiring, teachers could remain
on the life insurance policy so long as they assumed payment of the
premiums. 2 For many years, the annual cost of the life insurance
policy was the cost “in effect at the time of the teacher’s
retirement.” 3
In 2010, the town changed its insurance carrier to Minnesota
Life Insurance Company (Minnesota Life) and selected a policy
which “lowered the premium rate for active teachers and increased
the rate for retired teachers.” 4 Teachers who retired on or after
January 1, 2011 were required to pay the new higher premium
rate. 5 In August 2013, the town of Johnston entered into another
new policy agreement with Minnesota Life, which again
“significantly increased the annual rate for retired teachers.” 6
As a result of the increased rates, the plaintiffs, the Rhode
Island American Federation of Teachers/Retired Local 8307 and
several retirees of the Johnston School Department (the
1. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers/Retired Local 8037 v. Johnston Sch. Comm.,
212 A.3d 156, 157 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 157–58.
6. Id. at 158.
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Association) filed for declaratory judgment in Rhode Island
Superior Court against the defendants, the town of Johnston, the
Johnston School Department, the Johnston School Committee, and
various municipal officials (collectively, the Town). 7
The
Association argued per Rhode Island General Laws section 16-1642 (the statute), 8 that the Town is statutorily “required to provide
the life insurance policy at [the] annual cost that was in effect on
the last day of [a teacher’s] employment.” 9 The Association then
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plain language of
the statute prohibited the Town “from assessing increased life
insurance rates.” 10 The Town filed a cross motion for summary
judgment, countering that while the statute was “clear and
unambiguous,” the plain, ordinary meaning of the statute only
required the Town to provide retirees with “the option of retaining
the life insurance policy at ‘an amount equal to the annual cost of
the policy for the individual at the time of the individual’s
retirement.’” 11 The Town contended that if the price of the
insurance premium rate increased, it would be for the retiree to
cover in full.12 The Town argued that it complied with the statute
by “providing the retirees with the option of continuing the
insurance coverage at the rate in effect at the retiree’s
retirement.” 13
The Superior Court justice, after hearing arguments on both
motions, granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment
and declared that the Town was “required to provide life insurance
to each retiree at the same annual cost that was in effect on the last

7. Id.
8. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-16-42.
9. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 212 A.3d at 158 n.5.
10. The association argued the plain language of the statute requires the
Town to provide life insurance to retired teachers at the same annual cost it
paid before the teacher retired. Id. at 158.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 157–58.
13. Id. at 158.
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day of his or her employment.” 14 The Town subsequently appealed
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court (the Court). 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the Town contended that the Superior Court erred
in granting the Association’s motion for summary judgment and
denying the Town’s cross-motion for summary judgment.16 The
Town argued that the trial justice “incorrectly interpreted [the
statute].” 17 The Court reviewed the applicability of the statute de
novo. 18 The statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary,
any member who, at the time of retirement from service,
has in effect life insurance provided for as a benefit of his
or her employment shall, after retirement, be entitled to
keep the policy of life insurance in effect by paying to the
city or town an amount equal to the annual cost of the
policy for the individual at the time of the individual’s
retirement. The policy of insurance shall remain in effect
for so long as the member continues to make annual
payments. 19
Although both parties agreed that the statutory language was
“clear and unambiguous,” they each presented a different
interpretation of the statute. 20
The Town argued that a plain and ordinary reading of the
phrases “at the time of retirement from service” and “at the time of
the individual’s retirement” makes clear that the Legislature
intended to provide retirees “with the opportunity to continue their
life insurance policy at the time period after they have
14. The Superior Court justice found the statute to be clear and
unambiguous, and reasoned “[a]s there is no other annual cost, the only
plausible meaning is that the Legislature intended the retiree to be substituted
as the payor on the already established plan at the rate paid by the [t]own.”
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 159.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 16 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-16-42.
20. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 212 A.3d at 159.
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The Town further
permanently” separated from service. 21
reasoned that the statute does not read “on their last day of active
employment,” and, therefore, the plain meaning of the statute is
that the cost of life insurance for retired teachers is “that which
[was] ‘in effect at the beginning of the retiree’s retirement.’” 22
The Association, however, argued that the statute “requires the
[T]own to provide retirees with the option of maintaining the
insurance policy that was in effect at their retirement at the same
annual cost that each retiree paid before retirement.” 23 The
Association contended the phrase “at the time of retirement”
referred to “the day the teacher separates from employment” and
the phrase “after retirement” referred to “when the teacher has
retired.” 24 Thus, according to the Association, teachers are entitled
to pay the same annual cost for their life insurance policies that
they paid while they were employed, not at a different retirement
rate. 25
Per the “well established statutory analysis,” 26 set forth in
prior Rhode Island Supreme Court precedent, 27 the Court
“constru[ed] the language of the statute in accordance with its plain
and ordinary meaning.” 28 The Court concluded that the statute did
not anticipate a “separate retiree rate.”29 Thus, the Town’s
teachers were “entitled to retain the insurance coverage in effect at
the time of retirement by paying the same annual cost that the
retiree paid . . . as an active employee.” 30
21. Id.
22. Id. In other words, in order to continue their life insurance policies,
the retirees were required to pay “the rate set for retirees, not the premium
before the teacher retires.” Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 159–60; See also Alessi v. Bowen Court Condominium, 44 A.3d
736, 740 (R.I. 2012) (“When the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the
words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning” (internal citation
omitted)); Webster v. Perotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001) (“In matters of
statutory interpretation our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the
act as intended by the Legislature”).
28. R.I. Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 212 A.3d at 160.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The Court found that the Legislature’s use of the phrases “at
the time of retirement” and “after retirement” “assigned
independent significance to each phrase.” 31 The Court concluded
the phrase “at the time of retirement” referred to “the day of or the
day before a teacher retires from active employment.” 32 The Court
“was satisf[ied] that the proper interpretation of the statute
provid[ed]” that any teacher who, at the time of his or her
retirement or on his or her last day of active employment, was
entitled to keep his or her life insurance policy in effect by paying
the Town the same premium rate he or she had paid at the time of
his or her retirement, or at the time of his or her last day of active
employment. 33 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the
Superior Court justice.34
COMMENTARY
The Court clearly acknowledged that the Court’s primary
objective in cases interpreting “clear and unambiguous” statutes is
to give effect to the Legislature’s intent and ensure that each word,
phrase, or sentence express its intended purpose. 35 However, given
the fact that both parties came to different and reasonable
conclusions about the statute’s meaning, it seems that the statute
was not entirely clear or unambiguous. 36 Under the Town’s
construction, the statute permitted it to pass the new insurance
policy premium rate onto retirees every time its contract with
Minnesota Life was renegotiated. 37 The Association, on the other
hand, construed the statute to allow retirees to pay the same
premium rate that they had paid while they were actively
employed. 38 To the Association, if the Town renegotiated the
Minnesota Life policy, then it was up to the Town to pay those
costs.39
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 159–60 (quoting State v. Clark, 974 A.2d 558, 571 (R.I. 2009) and
Webster v. Perotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)).
36. See id. at 159.
37. See id. at 157–58
38. Id. at 159.
39. See id.
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Ultimately,
the
Court
adopted
the
Association’s
interpretation. 40 However, the Court’s analysis of the statute
seems rather abrupt. The Court simply states that, because the
Legislature “incorporate[ed] the phrases ‘at the time of retirement’
and ‘after retirement,’” independent significance was assigned to
each phrase.41 Further, the Court concluded that the two phrases
collectively mean “the day of or the day before a teacher retires from
active employment.” 42 The Court’s analysis ends there—it provides
no further explanation for its decision. The Court should have gone
into further detail regarding why the Town’s interpretation was
unreasonable to ensure a full and robust analysis of the statutory
language. Perhaps, if the Legislature had intended for the
Association’s interpretation to be the true interpretation of the
statute, the Legislature would have been explicit in stating that the
rate the retirees would be required to pay would be the same rate
as the day of their retirement. The very fact that two reasonable
interpretations came from the same statute suggests that the
statute was, in fact, ambiguous.43 As such, the Court should have
gone deeper into the statutory interpretation, perhaps looking to
the statute’s legislative history and purpose, rather than just the
statute’s “plain meaning.” 44
The Court also seems to ignore the potential financial
implications its interpretation of the statute could have on the
Town. By adopting the Association’s interpretation, the Town is
now on the hook for covering the cost of retirees’ insurance policies.
Given that teachers may retire around 60 years of age, the Town
would ultimately be responsible for these ever-increasing policy
rates for myriad retirees for the rest of their lives, so long as they
desire life insurance coverage. These drastic financial implications
call into question the Court’s understanding of the legislative intent
animating the statute. Did the Rhode Island Legislature truly
intend to require the Town to pay for these life insurance rates?

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Rhode Island
General Laws § 16-16-42 requires cities and towns to provide
retired teachers the ability to continue their individual life
insurance policies at the same premium rate as the teacher paid on
the last day of his or her employment.45 The Court affirmed the
Superior Court justice’s ruling on the matter and the case was
remanded back to the Superior Court for further deliberation.46
Rachel Ricci

45.
46.

Id.
Id.

